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Using matched employer-employee level data drawn from the 2004 UK Workplace and 
Employee Relations Survey, we explore the determinants of a measure of worker 
commitment and loyalty (CLI) and whether CLI influences workplace performance. Factors 
influencing employee commitment and loyalty include age and gender, whilst workplace level 
characteristics of importance include human resource practices. With respect to the effects of 
employee commitment and loyalty upon the workplace, higher CLI is associated with 
enhanced workplace performance. Our findings that workplace human resources influence 
CLI suggest that employers may be able to exert some influence over the commitment and 
loyalty of its workforce, which, in turn, may affect workplace performance. 
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1.  Introduction 
A large empirical literature exists which explores the determinants of organizational 
performance. For example, Machin and Stewart (1990), McNabb and Whitfield (1998) and 
Munday et al. (2003) examine the determinants of financial performance, whilst Griliches 
and Regev (1995), Oulton (1998) and Griffiths and Simpson (2004) focus on the 
determinants of labor productivity. Many such studies are based on firm level data. One 
might argue, however, that, in order to understand the determinants of firm performance, it is 
important to also analyze employee level information given that the behavior of employees 
and the decisions they make may influence workplace performance. In this paper, we 
investigate whether the level of employee attachment to the organization influences 
workplace performance using matched employer-employee data. To be specific, we seek to 
ascertain whether worker commitment and loyalty influence labor productivity and financial 
performance at the firm level. In addition, we explore the determinants of such employee 
attitudes towards the organization for which they work in order to establish how such 
attachments may be fostered. 
The concept of organizational commitment has attracted a great deal of interest in the 
human resource management and psychology literatures. For example, employee 
commitment and loyalty are central features in the high performance workplace literature in 
which they are seen as mediating factors linking different types of human resource 
management and employment practices to enhanced performance. In this paper, we focus on 
affective commitment, which, according to Meyer and Allen (1991, p.67) refers to the “... 
employee’s emotional attachment to, identification with, and involvement in the 
organization.” They continue (op.cit.) “Employees with a strong affective commitment 3 
 
continue employment with the organization because they want to do so.”
1 Meyer et al. (1993, 
2002) argue that strong affective commitment to an organization arises because employees 
share values with both the organization and its members and it is therefore predicted to be 
positively associated with job performance. Moreover, establishing a committed and loyal 
workforce may be associated with enhanced firm performance through less opportunistic 
behavior on the part of employees (Green, 2008) or through influencing their supply of effort, 
and hence output.  Employees’ decisions over their supply of effort play a key role in various 
incentive models of worker compensation (see, for example, Lazear, 2000) as well as in the 
efficiency wage literature (see Akerlof, 1982 and Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). Given such a 
relationship between employee effort and commitment, an interesting line of enquiry 
concerns how the firm may influence the level of affective commitment via human resource 
(HR) practices. 
Employee commitment and loyalty thus arguably play an important role in the 
principal-agent issues surrounding the separation between the ownership and control of an 
organization. The costs associated with delegated decision-making clearly depend on the 
extent to which the interests of the principal and agent differ (see, for example, Aghion and 
Tirole, 1997, and Athey and Roberts, 2001).  In so far as employees who exhibit commitment 
and loyalty towards their employer may have interests which are aligned with those of their 
employer, the agency costs often associated with the employee-employer relationship are 
reduced. One attempt to construct an economic model of identity and work incentives, thus 
capturing such motivations, is Akerlof and Kranton (2005), whose analysis, within a 
principal-agent framework, suggests that instilling in employees “a sense of identity and 
                                                 
1 Meyer and Allen (1991) introduce a three-component model of organizational commitment. In addition to 
affective commitment, according to Meyer et al. (1993, p.539), employees “with a strong continuance 
commitment remain [with the organization] because they need to, and those with a strong normative 
commitment remain because they feel they ought to do so.” Though, in their the review of the Workplace and 
Employee Relations Survey (WERS) 2004, Bewley et al. (2010) recommend extending the questionnaire in 
WERS 2011 to include both normative and continuance commitment, WERS 2004, on which our paper is based, 
includes only affective commitment, limiting our study accordingly. 4 
 
attachment to an organization is critical to well-functioning enterprises” (op. cit., p. 11). We 
introduce and apply their framework in our theoretical discussion below. 
Given that the degree of commitment and loyalty of employees towards their employer 
is fundamentally linked to the way in which employees conduct themselves at the workplace, 
as well as the agency considerations that underpin the relationship between employees and 
employers, it is surprising that employee commitment and loyalty have attracted only limited 
attention in the economics literature. In the following section we outline a theoretical 
framework to explain the link between HR practices, affective commitment and worker and 
firm performance in the context of the principal-agent problem. In the empirical analysis 
which then follows, we firstly explore the determinants of affective commitment at the 
employee level with the focus on how HR practices influence such commitment. Secondly, 
we explore the implications of employee commitment and loyalty for financial performance 
and labor productivity at the firm level, which contrasts with the focus in the management 
and psychology literatures, which have tended to focus on the relationship between employee 
commitment and job performance rather than firm performance. 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
In this section we discuss a theoretical rationale for our empirical findings of a positive link 
between various HR practices and worker commitment through to improved firm 
performance. Our theoretical approach has two parts. We begin by setting out the theoretical 
channels (supported by empirical evidence) through which HR practices influence affective 
commitment. We then demonstrate that the positive link between affective commitment and 
firm performance can be explained as a logical prediction of the principal-agent model 
developed to include affective commitment.
2 
 
                                                 
2 Though indicating theoretical channels through which HR practices may influence firm performance via 
worker commitment, our discussion is not intended to be exhaustive. 5 
 
2.1   Affective Commitment and Loyalty 
Numerous authors have identified links between HR practices and affective commitment. Of 
the various factors recognized as having an influence on affective commitment, those 
relevant to the present study (and discussed in more detail below) are organizational 
communication, raising commitment through empowerment of the employee (e.g. Stuart, 
1999) or though employee participation and involvement (e.g. Cotton et al., 1998) and the 
establishment of organizational trust (e.g. Mayfield and Mayfield, 2002). 
Organizational Information and Communication 
The process by which employees are made aware of organizational goals and their 
involvement in the achievement of them is recognized to play an important role in fostering 
job commitment (e.g., Anderson and Martin, 1995; Haskins, 1996). Goris et al. (2000) and 
Ooi et al. (2006) find organizational communication to have an important positive association 
with affective commitment, whilst Brunetto and Farr-Whartons’ (2004, p.594) findings “... 
suggest a strong relationship between communication processes and job satisfaction and 
affective job commitment...”.  
Employee Involvement and Participation 
Employee participation, which includes such things as involvement in joint decision making, 
has been shown to have a positive association with positive work attitudes and employee 
commitment (e.g. Cassar, 1999). Ooi et al. (2006), who find a positive association between 
employee participation and affective commitment, note the positive effects of participation on 
job satisfaction, changing certain personality characteristics of employees. As we will see 
later, the idea of policies aimed at altering personality characteristics plays a central role in 





Gilbert and Tang (1998, p.322) define organizational trust as “... a feeling of confidence and 
support in an employer; it is the belief that an employer will be straightforward and will 
follow through on commitments”. Various researchers have found organizational trust to be a 
significant predictor of organizational commitment (e.g. Podsakoff et al., 1996, and Ashford 
et al., 1989), and specifically, affective commitment (e.g. Karia and Ahmad, 2000, and Ooi et 
al., 2006). 
Ideally it would be possible to distinguish the influences of each of these factors on 
affective commitment. However, it appears that there is a strong interrelationship between 
information, involvement and organizational trust making such delineation difficult. For 
example, Mayfield and Mayfield (2002, p.90) observe that “...communication mechanisms 
for establishing and sustaining trust affect commitment”. Hartmann and Bambacas (2000) 
argue that work experiences, such as role clarity, are related to the feeling of belonging which 
can further be linked to affective commitment. It seems logical to suppose that issues such as 
role clarity would be a function of both organizational communication and employee 
involvement. According to Mishra and Morrissey (1990), trust is inculcated by openness of 
communication, sharing decision making, critical information and perceptions and feelings 
with employees. As such communication, employee involvement and participation and trust 
are overlapping. Though in this paper we seek to determine the relative importance of each of 
these factors, the above discussion indicates their impact may be jointly determined. Indeed, 
our findings strongly support the joint significance of HR practices on affective commitment. 
2.2   Basic Principal-Agent Model 
In the principal-agent model, the principal (the employer) has an interest in inducing the 
agent (the employee) to undertake an action that is costly to the agent. The typical principal-
agent problem arises when (i) the principal is unable to observe what action the agent has 7 
 
taken, and (ii) it is not possible to infer the agent’s action from an observation of the agent’s 
output. The question is then one of how to define a payment contract that incentivises the 
agent to choose the costly action. 
 Let  ∈   be the action of the agent, where   is the agent’s action set. Let    be the 
cost to the agent of action  . For simplicity, we restrict the discussion to two distinct actions: 
 , ∈  , where   is the principal’s preferred action but    >   .  In line with condition (i) 
we assume asymmetric information: the agent knows which action is undertaken but the 
principal does not. Now, suppose that the agent’s output,  , is a function of its action, 
  =  ( ) and that the function is known to the principal. Condition (ii) now requires that 
  =  ( ) is not one-to-one. A standard way to achieve this is by assuming that output can 
take on a finite number of possible levels:    ∈    (  =1,…, ) and that     is the probability 
that output    will be observed given that the agent’s action is  ∑     =1  
    . We assume that 
the principal is risk-neutral and the agent is risk-averse. We describe the agent’s preferences 
using a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function which, for simplicity, is linear in action 
cost, so the expected utility for the agent under action   is given by    = ∑  (  
 
    )     −
   where   (  ) is the payment contract employed by the principal. The principal’s objective 
is then to solve: 
max   ∑ (   −   )     
 
                      (1) 
s.t. 
∑  (  
 
    )     −   ≥∑  (    
 
    )     −              (2) 
∑  (  
 
    )     −    ≥                    (3) 
where     is the reservation level of utility, (2) is the incentive compatibility constraint and (3) 
is the participation constraint. 9 
 
action * and may reveal this to the employee, the ‘non-trusting’ employee realises that the 
employer has an incentive to distort the information and underestimates the expected utility 
derived from the higher level of effort and/or over estimates the associated cost of effort.  
From inspection of (2) it is now clear that, against the backdrop of such informational 
asymmetry, improvements in HR organizational communication or employee involvement/ 
participation that help reveal to the employee the true rewards and costs of action + alongside 
an understanding of, or improvements in, organizational trust (and the willingness of the 
employee to revise ,- ./ and 0̃1) will promote action 2 relative to 3. 
These points have been based on an extension of the asymmetric information in the 
principal-agent problem to include the employer having important information that the 
employee does not but that through pursuing HR practices that offer a combination of 
improved participation, communication and trust, has been partially resolved leading to better 
informed choices and higher productivity. However, we now explore a further possible way 
in which greater affective commitment may yield beneficial performance outcomes via 
another adaptation of the basic principal-agent model.  
2.4   HR to Influence Employee Identity 
There are a limited number of examples of attempts to model worker commitment and 
productivity in the economics literature. Green (2008) argues that, from an economist's 
perspective, affective commitment can be regarded as a proxy for the utility associated with 
working for the current employer as compared to doing the same job with the next best 
employer, thereby establishing firm-specific utility, which potentially plays an important role 
in employee decision-making and workplace behavior. AK attempt to formalize the link 
between commitment and effort (hence productivity) in the principal-agent framework. They 
do so by embracing concepts from management and psychology and attempting to fit them 
into a utility framework. We integrate their model in our discussion as follows. 10 
 
In the AK model employee utility is a function of the employee’s identity and  
employee identity can be influenced by the practices of the organization. Suppose an 
employee can take an identity  4 ∈ 6. For simplicity we consider two possible identities 
7,8 ∈ : where  ; represents an ‘insider’ and  < represents an ‘outsider’. In the AK 
framework, identity has an associated ‘norm’. So an employee with identity = works in the 
organization’s interests (e.g. effort  >) and loses utility if they deviate from this action. 
Clearly, if  ? = @ then the organization experiences a reduction in the wage needed to 
stimulate action  A. AK essentially extend the principal-agent model (equations 1-3) by 
replacing the linear cost term BC in (2) with an expression that can be interpreted as a net cost 
of effort: 
DE = FG + HI|JK(L) − NO| − QR                (4) 
In (4) ST is the cost of the employee’s ‘actual’ action (effort U), the term VW represents the 
utility that the employee gets from being in identity category X, whilst YZ|[K(\)− ^_| is the 
penalty associated with divergence from the employee’s ‘ideal’ effort given their identity ‘, 
aK(b). AK’s argument is then that the firm invests in inculcating the employee, building 
commitment, hoping to move an employee’s identity from ‘outsider’ to ‘insider’, thereby 
eliminating the penalty associated with effort c and possibly raising de. Both of these effects 
reduce the ‘net cost’ term and hence raise the L.H.S. of (2) relative to the R.H.S. raising the 
prospect of the ‘high’ effort outcome. 
In what follows, we firstly explore the determinants of affective commitment at the 
employee level with the focus on how HR practices influence such commitment. Secondly, 
we explore the implications of employee commitment and loyalty for financial performance 
and labor productivity at the firm level, which contrasts with the focus in the management 
and psychology literature, which is generally on the relationship between employee 
commitment and job performance rather than firm performance. 11 
 
3.  Data 
In order to explore the relationship between employee commitment, loyalty and firm 
performance, we analyse data from the 2004 Workplace and Employee Relations Survey 
(WERS). This is the fifth in a Government funded series of surveys conducted at British 
workplaces. The previous four surveys were conducted in 1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998, and 
prior to 1998, it was called the Workplace and Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS). The aim 
of these surveys is to provide nationally representative data on the current state of workplace 
relations and employment practices in Britain, and it is widely regarded as the principal 
source of information pertaining to changes in British industrial relations (Chaplin et al., 
2005). The survey population for the 2004 WERS is all British workplaces with at least five 
employees except for those in agriculture, hunting and forestry, fishing, mining and 
quarrying, private households with employed persons, and extra-territorial organizations. The 
sample comprises 2,295 workplaces, whilst the sample used for our econometric analysis 
includes 1,432 workplaces due to missing data. The 2004 WERS has four main sections: the 
Worker Representative Questionnaire; the Financial Performance Questionnaire; the 
Management Questionnaire; and the Employee Questionnaire. The first three sections yield 
establishment level information, whilst the final section (the Employee Questionnaire) 
provides employee level information. The focus of our empirical analysis is upon the final 
two sections. 
Employee Questionnaire 
Up to 25 employees from each workplace were asked to complete the Employee 
Questionnaire yielding a sample of 17,208 employees after conditioning on missing data. The 
Employee Questionnaire contains information on a number of measures of employees’ 
attitudes towards both their jobs and their workplaces. In particular, employees are asked to 
indicate how strongly they agree or disagree with each statement: (i) I share many values of 12 
 
my organization  and (ii)  I feel loyal to my organization. Responses to the former yield 
information pertaining to the individual’s commitment to their employer (c ),
4 whilst 
responses to the latter indicate the level of the individual’s loyalty to their organization (l). 
From this information, we have constructed two five point indices where 4 (0) represents the 
maximum (minimum) extent to which individuals agree with the above statements. The 




















where w denotes the workplace subscript and i represents the individual subscript, i.e. wi 
denotes workplace  w employing individual  i. The figures in parenthesis indicate the 
percentage in each category.
5 The measure of commitment used in the present study is 
derived from the six statement scale developed by Lincoln and Kallenberg (1990) to capture 
Meyer and Allen’s construct of affective commitment. The Lincoln-Kallenberg measurement 
of affective commitment, itself a simplification of the more general Organizational 
Commitment Questionnaire developed by Mowday et al. (1979), has been used widely in the 
US and UK (amongst the latter, see Gallie et al. 1998, 2001; and White et al., 2003).  The 
WERS measure of affective commitment, however, uses only three of the six statements 
designed to capture an employee’s identification with the goals and values of the organization 
in which they are employed and is thus, arguably, a less precise indicator. However, work by 
Gallie et al. (1998) and Bryson and White (2008) demonstrates that the WERS measure is 
                                                 
4 In one of the early studies in this area, Buchanan (1974) defines organizational commitment as being dedicated 
to the purposes and values of an organization. The WERS survey question ties in with such a definition. 
5 It should be acknowledged that our analysis is based on self-reported data and the assumption that 
interpersonal comparisons can be made. The use of such data is becoming increasingly widespread in the 
economics literature and support for such data can be found in Guest (1990). In an early study, Hogan and 
Fleishman (1979) support the use of such data citing results from laboratory studies comparing perceived and 
actual effort exertion in physical activities. They report a highly significant positive correlation between actual 
metabolic rate and perceived effort in conducting a selection of occupational tasks.  13 
 
effective in terms of its reliability and predictive power thereby endorsing its construct 
validity. To be specific, the WERS measure has a high Cronbach alpha measure and a high 
Kuder-Richardson reliability measure, indicating a high level of reliability. In addition, the 
WERS commitment measure is found to be positively correlated with measures of job 
satisfaction and employee well-being (Bryson and White, 2008). Similarly, Green (2008) 
finds that this measure is characterised by good scale properties with a high Cronbach scale 
reliability coefficient. Furthermore, Green (p.13) states that the items included in the WERS 
measure constitute ‘the core of the notion of affective commitment’. 
Arguably, employees may be unable to distinguish between their commitment and their 
loyalty to the organization, so following Green (2008), we adopt a hybrid combination of the 
two questions by generating an additive scale based upon Cronbach’s alpha ranging from 0 to 
4, where the scale of reliability is 0.77, which we term the commitment-loyalty index (CLI), 
our proxy for affective commitment. The distribution across categories 0 to 4 is as follows: 
1.27%; 5.15%; 21.54%; 52.31% and 19.74% respectively.
6 The first part of the empirical 
analysis, presented in Section 4, investigates the determinants of CLI at the employee level. If 
employee loyalty and commitment towards the workplace influence workplace performance, 
it is important to ascertain which employee and workplace characteristics are associated with 
employee commitment and loyalty. 
Management Questionnaire 
In Section 5, we conduct workplace level analysis in order to explore the determinants of 
labor productivity and financial performance. The labor productivity and financial 
performance measures are derived from the following question included in the Management 
Questionnaire: I now want to ask you how your workplace is currently performing compared 
with other establishments in the same industry. How would you assess your workplace’s (i) 
                                                 
6 We have also conducted our analysis with categories 0 and 1 amalgamated. Our results are largely unchanged. 
In addition, we have conducted the analysis without combining the two questions, i.e. analysing them 
separately. These results, which are discussed below, are available on request. 14 
 
financial performance and (ii) labour productivity? The management representative was 
asked to indicate in which of the following categories financial performance ( w FP ) and labor 
productivity ( w LP ) lay: (i) a lot better than average; (ii) better than average; (iii) about 
average; (iv) below average or a lot below average. From the responses to these questions, we 
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where  w denotes the workplace subscript and the figures in parenthesis indicate the 
percentage in each category. It is apparent that both measures of firm performance are 
subjective and that the response rates also suggest that there is a bias towards the ‘above 
average’ categories. Consequently, both performance variables may be subject to 
measurement error (e.g. see Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001, and Forth and McNabb, 2008).  
Insofar as the measurement error is random, this reduces our ability to explain variations in 
workplace performance. However, if the measurement error correlates with the explanatory 
variables this will give rise to spurious correlations with the subjective variable. An example 
of this is common-rater bias where a respondent answers in a positive (negative) way about 
their workplace in terms of both its work practices and its performance irrespective of the 
true state of affairs.  
In the present context, the significance of this problem will arguably be mitigated due 
to the fact that data on the explanatory variables of interest are provided by employees 
whereas the subjective performance measures are provided by management representatives. 
One would expect there to be less correlation between the measurement error in the latter 
measures and these explanatory variables. Moreover, evaluations of these subjective 
measures have indicated that the ordinal properties of the data are unaffected by such bias 15 
 
(see Bryson et al., 2005) and that a comparison of these subjective measures and objective 
profitability and productivity data are weakly equivalent and produce similar results in fairly 
basic structural models (Forth and McNabb, 2008).
7 
Our set of explanatory variables includes an extensive set of controls for HR practices 
(see Section 2.1) drawn from the Employee Questionnaire. In order to control for 
organizational communication, we include four five point indices controlling for the 
employee’s perception of the extent to which the managers at the workplace keep employees 
informed about: changes to the way the organization is run; changes in staffing; changes in 
the way work is undertaken; and financial matters including budgets and profits. For each 
index, 0 denotes very poor, 1 denotes poor, 2 denotes neither good nor poor, 3 denotes good 
and 4 denotes very good.  
Turning to employee involvement, we include three five point indices controlling for 
the employee’s perception of the extent to which managers at the work place: seek the views 
of employees or employee representatives; respond to suggestions from employees or 
employee representatives; allow employees or employee representatives to influence 
financial decisions. These variables are derived from the Employee Questionnaire of WERS. 
We also include an index of the frequency at which the senior management of the workplace 
meets with employees, which runs from less than every three months through to daily, and a 
binary indicator for whether workplace targets are set in conjunction with employees. These 
two variables are constructed from the Management Questionnaire. A sixteen point index is 
included, constructed from the Employee Questionnaire, in order to capture the amount of 
influence employees at the workplace have over: tasks carried out; the pace of work; the 
                                                 
7 In the Financial Performance Questionnaire, continuous measures of workplace financial performance, such as 
sales turnover and profit per employee, are recorded. However, the sample sizes are greatly reduced (roughly 25 
per cent of firms remain) and it is likely that any empirical analysis would be based upon a non random sample. 
More specifically, Chaplin et al. (2005) state that a relatively high percentage of workplaces declined to take 
part in this section of the WERS, with a lower average response rate reported for those firms listed on the stock 
exchange. Consequently, in what follows, we do not analyse these continuous variables of firm performance.  16 
 
organization of work; order of work; and the times at which work starts and finishes. Higher 
values of the index indicate a higher level of employee influence. In addition, monitoring and 
supervision play a prominent role in the organizational commitment literature. Hence, we 
include an index of the proportion of non-managerial staff with supervisory duties based on 
the responses to the following question: What proportion of non-managerial employees here 
have job duties that involve supervising other employees? This is created from the 
Management Questionnaire in WERS.  
Turning to organizational trust, we include four five point indices to control for the 
extent to which employees are of the opinion that managers in the organization: can be relied 
upon to keep their promises; are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views; deal 
with employees honestly; and treat employees fairly. Each of these five point indices are 
derived from the Employee Questionnaire of WERS, where 0 denotes very poor, 1 denotes 
poor, 2 denotes neither good nor poor, 3 denotes good and 4 denotes very good.  
The organizational communication, employee involvement and trust variables are 
included in  wi Z  and are expected to influence CLI as hypothesized in Section 2. Table 2 
shows their distributions. Those HR practices associated with information reveal that the 
majority of individuals think that the organization in which they work has good or very good 
practices in relation to every day running, changes in staffing etc. Only a relatively small 
proportion of employees think that the organization is very poor in keeping them informed, 
between 8% and 18% for information regarding how the job is undertaken and changes in 
finances, respectively. With respect to employee involvement, most employees believe that 
their employers are good at seeking the views of the workers (33.7%) and that managers are 
good at reacting to employee concerns (30.37%), with less than 15% thinking that managers 
are very poor at reacting to both types of involvement. Turning to the influence that 
employees have on firm financial decisions, there are far more responses in the category 17 
 
‘very poor’ at 21.37%. Interestingly, just under 21% of establishments never have 
consultation meetings with employees whilst around 22% of firms meet with their staff at 
around monthly intervals.  Over 50% of establishments have between 0% and 19% of non 
managerial staff monitoring other employees, and less than 15% of establishments have over 
40% of non managerial staff having a supervisory role. Focusing on discretion over work 
tasks, based on a scale of zero to fifteen, where the mean is 9.8 (see Table 1), around 43% of 
employees are below the average, which implies they have less discretion over their work. 
Focusing upon proxies for trust in the organization, around 8% of employees believe that 
their employer is very poor at: keeping their promises; sincere in understanding employee 
views; dealing with employees honestly; and treating employees fairly. However, around 
50% of employees are at the other end of the distribution (i.e. the good or very good 
categories).  
4.  Employee Level Analysis 
Methodology 
Given that employee CLI may influence workplace level performance, which is explored 
below in Section 5, we focus initially on the determinants of employee CLI. We conduct a 
generalized ordered probit analysis in order to explore the correlates of  CLI allowing for 
clustering within establishments, which accounts for repeated firm observations.
8 The 
generalized ordered probit model for CLI is modeled as follows: 
fghij
K = klmno + pqr                   (5) 
where stuvw
K  is a latent variable denoting the unobserved propensity of individual i employed 
in workplace w to be committed-loyal to workplace w; xyz{| is the individual’s observed 
level of commitment-loyalty; }~￿ is a vector of exogenous characteristics which are expected 
                                                 
8 We adopt the generalised ordered probit approach, which is advantageous in that the cut-off points are allowed 
to vary between individuals in contrast to the standard ordered probit model. 18 
 
to influence       
K ;   is the associated vector of coefficients; and     is the error term, which 
contains a white noise element and a cluster specific firm effect which specifies that the 
observations are independent across firms but not necessarily within firms (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2005). Our focus in the employee level analysis lies in exploring the role of HR 
practices in influencing CLI.  
Additional workplace characteristics that we control for include: a quadratic in 
workplace size as proxied by the number of employees; the number of dismissals, 
redundancies and suspensions at the workplace as a percentage of total employment within 
the workplace, which are expected to have a negative impact on commitment and loyalty. In 
addition, we control for employee characteristics such as gender and age as well as job 
characteristics such as: trade union membership; whether the employee works part-time; 
whether she/he is employed on a permanent contract; whether the individual’s performance is 
subject to regular appraisals; whether the employee is a new recruit at the workplace (i.e. 
workplace tenure is less than one year); and the individual’s wage rate. Summary statistics 
for the variables used in our empirical analysis are presented in Table 1, and Table 2 reports 
the distribution of the HR variables and proxies for employee trust in the organization. 
Results 
The results of estimating equation (5) are presented in Table 3 where we focus on the 
marginal effects for each category from the lowest through to the highest level, i.e. categories 
0 to 4, where the two extreme categories denote ‘strongly disagree’ and ‘strongly agree’ 
respectively.
9   
  Employee characteristics, specifically age and gender, play the largest roles in terms of 
the magnitude of the marginal effects across the  CLI thresholds. For example, those 
individuals in the youngest age group are more likely to respond in the lowest CLI category 
                                                 
9 Estimated coefficients in ordered response models have no natural interpretation since the sign of the 
coefficient only uniquely determines the change in probability at the top and bottom categories of the dependent 
variable, see Cameron and Trivedi (2005). Hence, we follow convention and focus on the marginal effects. 19 
 
relative to those individuals aged over 65 by 78 percentage points. Conversely, such 
individuals are 10 percentage points less likely to respond at the other extreme of the CLI 
distribution, i.e. the highest category. Part-time employees are less likely to harbour high 
levels of  CLI, which is an effect over and above contract type (which is statistically 
insignificant). Turning to other employee characteristics, there are no effects from being a 
recent recruit to the firm upon  CLI.
10 Trade union membership is found to lower the 
probability that an employee will respond in the top category of CLI by around 1 percentage 
point. This finding is consistent with the literature on unions and absenteeism (Chaudhury 
and Ng, 1992, and Leigh, 1981; 1985), which shows that union members go absent more 
often than non-union employees. With respect to the individual’s wage, a one per cent 
increase in the log wage increases the probability that the individual reports the highest 
category for CLI by 0.04 percentage points.  
  Turning to the HR practices controls, these are generally individually statistically 
significant at the highest category of CLI having the largest effects in terms of magnitude as 
compared to the effect on other categories of CLI, see Table 3. For example, those employees 
who are employed in a workplace which informs their employees over changes in the way 
that the organization is run are more than 2 percentage points more likely to respond in the 
highest CLI category. The level of supervision decreases the probability that the individual is 
in the lowest category of CLI, and, at the other end of the CLI index, increases the probability 
of responding in the highest category, although the magnitude of the effect is small at all 
points on the  CLI  distribution. Individuals who are employed in establishments where 
managers seek employees’ views are 1.7 percentage points more likely to respond in the 
                                                 
10 As highlighted by a referee, individuals who have a higher intrinsic propensity to be committed or loyal to 
their employing firm may select into firms with particular HR practices. Hence, such a distinction might be 
important in determining whether firms are able to influence CLI by adopting specific HR practices or whether 
the firm is attracting a more committed pool of labor. Although the absence of information relating to 
employees over time means that we cannot directly test this, it is interesting to note that the results indicate no 
statistically significant difference in CLI across new recruits and other employees. 20 
 
highest category of CLI. Similarly, there are positive influences at the top end of the CLI 
distribution from allowing employees to influence financial decisions, the frequency of 
consultation meetings with employees and setting targets in consultation with employees, at 
0.7, 0.5 and 1.1 percentage points, respectively. The HR practices variables are generally 
jointly significant both within and across the CLI categories. The proxies for the trust that 
employees have in the management of the organization have their largest influence at the top 
end of the distribution. For example, employees who believe that managers can be relied 
upon to keep promises are approximately 3 percentage points more likely to respond at the 
top end of the CLI distribution.   
  In general, focusing on the role of HR practices on the probability of being in the 
‘strongly agree’ category of  CLI, it is apparent that the marginal effects are largest in 
magnitude for those HR practices associated with employee involvement and participation. 
However, as discussed in Section 2.1, there is likely to be potential overlap between the 
controls in each of the three groups: information and communication; employee involvement 
and participation; and organizational trust. Hence, in order to explore the robustness of our 
findings, we obtain an overall composite measure of each of the three groups of variables. 
The three hybrid combinations are generated on an additive scale based upon Cronbach’s 
alpha, where the scale of reliability is above 0.7 for each measure. Equation (5) is then re-
estimated conditioning  CLI  upon the three composite measures, the results of which are 
shown in Table 4 Panel A. Clearly, at any point on the commitment and loyalty index, the 
information and communication measure is outweighed in terms of the magnitude of the 
marginal effects by the involvement and participation measure. Hence, it would appear that 
HR strategies which target issues other than information and communication may be more 
advantageous in gaining higher levels of affective commitment. In accordance with the 
theoretical predictions in Section 2, there is evidence that the employees’ trust in the 21 
 
organization also has a significant influence across the CLI distribution. In Panels B through 
to D of Table 4, equation (5) is re-estimated including each composite index one at a time. 
This will mitigate any co-linearity between the indexes which may occur by including each 
composite measure simultaneously. Clearly, the resultant message remains in that generally 
the influence of involvement and participation outweighs that of information and 
communication. Having explored the determinants of employee affective commitment to the 
workplace, the following analysis investigates whether the average level of employee CLI 
within the workplace influences workplace performance.
11 
5.  Workplace Performance 
Methodology 
The following workplace performance models are estimated where the average level of the 
employee commitment-loyalty index (CLI) within the workplace,           , is included in the set 
of explanatory variables: 
    
K =  l   +              +                     (6) 
    
K =  l   +              +                    (7) 
where     
K and     
K represent two latent variables denoting the unobserved propensity of 
workplace  w  to achieve a certain level of labor productivity and financial performance, 
respectively;    is a vector of workplace characteristics expected to influence     
K and     
K  
where  ,  ,    and    are the associated vectors of coefficients; and     (j=1,2) are random 
error terms. Thus, the estimated coefficients on            indicate the nature of the relationship 
between average employee  CLI within the workplace and the measures of workplace 
                                                 
11 Although our focus is on the determinants of affective commitment, i.e. the utility associated with working for 
a particular firm, we also explore the effect of including financial considerations in the set of explanatory 
variables, which serve to influence the budget constraint of the employee and, hence, might reflect factors which 
would not be expected to influence affective commitment. To be specific, we control for merit or performance 
pay, profit-sharing and employee share ownership. Our findings indicate that such factors do not influence CLI. 22 
 
performance.
12 Equations (6) and (7) are estimated using a generalized ordered probit 
specification over the sample of 1,432 workplaces. The sampling frame used for WERS 2004 
was the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR), which is maintained by the Office for 
National Statistics (ONS). Establishment sampling fractions have been used according to the 
UK Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) 2003 on the IDBR, with the data being weighted 
by the probability of selection before the empirical analysis of equations (6) and (7) is 
undertaken in order to make the sample representative of the designated population, hence 
reducing non response bias. 
The vector of explanatory variables,    , is based on the existing literature and 
includes: quadratics in workplace size and workplace age; controls for whether the firm is 
foreign owned or a UK multinational; industrial affiliation; controls for the presence of 
performance related pay or employee share ownership at the workplace; a dummy indicator 
for whether there is a recognized trade union at the workplace; a public sector dummy 
variable;
13 and the percentages of unskilled, female and ethnic minority employees in the 
workplace. As a proxy for the relative importance of labor costs within the workplace, we 
also include a four point index indicating the percentage of the workplace’s sales revenue or 




                                                 
12 As mentioned in Section 3, we have also investigated incorporating commitment and loyalty simultaneously 
as two separate measures: only commitment was statistically significant. However, if entered separately, both 
commitment and loyalty were found to be significantly associated with workplace performance. These results 
are available from the authors upon request. This suggests that employees may not be able to discern the 
difference between the two survey questions and, hence, supports the use of a composite measure. 
13 We have also undertaken the empirical analysis excluding the public sector, with the key findings generally 
unchanged. These results are available on request. However, 20% of the sample of workplaces are in the public 
sector, hence excluding such workplaces significantly reduces our sample size. Moreover, substantial variation 
exists in the mean level of each measure of performance within the public sector where the standard deviations 
for labor productivity and financial performance are: 0.667 and 0.729, respectively, (for comparison see Table 1 
for the overall sample). 
14 In terms of the labor cost index, a value of zero denotes less than 25%; one denotes 25% to 50%; two denotes 
50% to 75%; and three denotes 75% or more. The index indicating the proportion of sales revenue or operating 
costs accounted for by labor costs enables us to proxy the importance of labor costs relative to the costs of other 
factor inputs. 23 
 
Results 
Table 5 presents the results of estimating the relationship between workplace performance 
and          , with the results of estimating equations (6) and (7) summarised in Panel A. It is 
apparent from Panel A that, for our sample of 1,432 workplaces, employee           is positively 
associated with higher levels of the two measures of workplace performance.
15 Due to the 
ordered nature of the labor productivity and financial performance indices, we focus on the 
marginal effects for each category, lowest through to highest, i.e. categories 0 to 3, where the 
two extreme categories denote ‘below average’ and ‘a lot above average’ respectively.  
  With respect to labor productivity,      , shown in the first column of Table 5, the 
marginal effects presented in Panel A indicate that           is associated with a decrease  in the 
probability that workplace labor productivity is  ‘below average’ by 10 percentage points 
evaluated at the sample mean. Conversely,           is also associated with an increase in the 
probability that labor productivity is ‘a lot above average’ by 9 percentage points evaluated 
at the sample mean.
16 We replicate the above analysis focusing on the alternative measure of 
workplace performance, financial performance (     ), in the second column of Table 5. The 
results are consistent with those found for labor productivity in that higher levels of           are 
associated with a decrease in the probability of financial performance being ‘below average’. 
Evaluated at the sample mean, the largest effect of           serves to increase the probability that 
workplace financial performance is ‘above average’ by 16 percentage points.  
  It is possible that for certain occupations employees may have more discretion over 
their effort/productivity. Consequently, the influence of average CLI upon firm labor 
                                                 
15 For brevity, we omit the full results of estimating the models of workplace performance. In accordance with 
the existing literature, our findings suggest that workplace size, whether the workplace has performance related 
pay or employee share ownership, all increase the probability of having the highest level of financial 
performance. Conversely, workplace age, a high proportion of labor costs relative to sales revenue and the 
proportion of ethnic employees decrease the probability of attaining high workplace performance. These results 
are available from the authors on request. 
16 These calculations are based on the mean sample characteristics of workplaces. For example, the 10 
percentage point effect is calculated by multiplying the marginal effect by the mean of average CLI. 24 
 
productivity or financial performance may be somewhat different across occupations. To 
investigate this possibility we interact            with binary indicators representing the largest 
occupation group within the firm (based upon the UK 2000 Social Occupational 
Classification): professional; associate professional and technical; administrative and 
secretarial; skilled trade; personal service; sales and customer service; process, plant and 
machine operatives; and elementary occupations. The results of this analysis are presented in 
Table 5 Panel B where the influence of           at each point of the labor productivity index and 
the financial performance index varies by occupation, in particular at the two extremes of the 
workplace performance measures. For example, at the extremes of both workplace 
performance measures,            generally has a larger effect in firms where the principal 
occupational group is professional or associate professional, which are arguably occupations 
associated with a greater degree of autonomy and discretion over tasks performed. 
  To summarise, our workplace results suggest that CLI is positively related to higher 
levels of labor productivity and financial performance at the workplace. Moreover, the 
magnitudes of the estimated effects suggest that engendering worker attachment to the 
organization is potentially an important conduit for improved workplace performance, along 
the lines discussed in Section 2. It should be noted that workers who are more committed to 
their job or feel a greater obligation to their employer may be more likely to remain with a 
failing firm. This would generate a negative correlation between CLI and firm performance 
hence leading to an underestimate of the impact of CLI upon labor productivity and financial 
performance.
17,18  
                                                 
17 Workplaces which indicated that it was not possible to make comparisons about labor productivity or 
financial performance or that the relevant data were not available were excluded from our sample 
(approximately 32%). We have experimented with recoding the missing values in the dependent variable by 
including these workplaces in the ‘about average’ category, which increases the sample size to over 2,100. 
Testing the difference in the estimated coefficients between the estimates reported in Table 2 and those based 
upon the larger sample size reveals no significant difference in the estimated relationship between CLI and 
performance at the 1% level. Similarly, for the employee level results, the sample size of 17,208 employees is 
governed by the number of workplaces we analyse and, in addition, whether employees respond to the 25 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have analysed matched employer-employee data in order to explore the 
influence of employee commitment and loyalty on workplace performance. Our empirical 
findings suggest that employee commitment and loyalty are positively associated with higher 
levels of workplace performance. Arguably, it is thus in an establishment’s interest to foster 
such attachments as we explain through a theoretical justification. Hence, our empirical 
analysis highlights a potential avenue for productivity and financial gains at the establishment 
level, which has been somewhat neglected in the economics literature. Moreover, our 
employee level analysis of the determinants of employee attitudes suggests not only a role for 
worker characteristics, but also for workplace characteristics, in particular human resource 
practices and engendering employee trust in the organization, in influencing such 
attachments. Such findings suggest that establishments may be able to exert some control 
over the loyalty and commitment of its workforce, which, in turn, may enhance establishment 
performance. One interesting area of future research entails exploring how the interaction 
between different types of employee commitment may influence firm performance, as well as 
how human resources practices influence different types of commitment. 
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  MEAN  STD DEV  MIN  MAX 
WORKPLACE LEVEL ANALYSIS         
Financial Performance   1.5509  0.8097  0  3 
Labor Productivity   1.5001  0.7132  0  3 
Average Commitment Loyalty Index  2.9581  0.4680  0  4 
OBSERVATIONS  1,432 
EMPLOYEE LEVEL ANALYSIS         
Male  0.4730  0.4993  0  1 
Part time  0.2086  0.4064  0  1 
Age 16-19  0.0319  0.1760  0  1 
Age 20-29  0.1819  0.3858  0  1 
Age 30-39  0.2533  0.4349  0  1 
Age 40-49  0.2681  0.4430  0  1 
Age 50-59  0.2194  0.4139  0  1 
Age 60-64  0.0367  0.1879  0  1 
Tenure ≤ 1 year  0.1552  0.3621  0  1 
Permanent contract  0.9237  0.2655  0  1 
Trade union member  0.3712  0.4831  0  1 
Regular performance appraisal  0.7089  0.4543  0  1 
Log wage  10.9876  16.9769  0.44643  871 
Information and Communication         
Informed over way organization is run  2.1391  1.1675  0  4 
Informed over changes in staffing  2.2759  1.1611  0  4 
Informed over changes in way job undertaken  1.9432  1.0762  0  4 
Informed over changes in finances: budget & profit  9.7959  1.2293  0  4 
Employee Involvement and Participation         
Managers seek employee views  2.1523  1.1746  0  4 
Managers respond to employee concerns  2.0421  1.1644  0  4 
Employees influence financial decisions  1.6965  1.1854  0  4 
Frequency of employee consultation meetings  2.1002  1.7025  0  6 
Targets set in consultation with employees  0.3513  0.4774  0  1 
Discretion over work: e.g. tasks, pace, organization  9.7959  3.7616  0  15 
Index of % supervisors  1.6005  1.0799  0  6 
Organizational Trust         
Employers can be relied upon to keep promises  2.1751  1.1060  0  4 
Employers are sincere  2.3028  1.0095  0  4 
Employers deal with employees honestly  2.3430  1.0957  0  4 
Employers deal with employees fairly  2.3643  1.1258  0  4 
Other Workplace Controls         
Log workplace size  4.8366  1.5782  1.6094  8.7979 
Log  workplace  size squared  25.8832  16.1884  2.5903  77.4022 
Percentage of dismissals  1.1291  3.0991  0  100 
Percentage of redundancies  2.0706  8.7046  0  100 
Percentage of suspensions  4.2833  4.9488  0  100 
OBSERVATIONS  17,208  
TABLE 2: DISTRIBUTION OF ‘INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION’, ‘EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT AND PARTICIPATION’ AND 
‘ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST’ 
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Information and Communication               
Informed over way organization is run 
a  9.48%  17.06%  23.17%  37.51%  12.78%  –  – 
Informed over changes in staffing 
a  10.61%  19.30%  25.97%  33.83%  10.30%  –  – 
Informed over changes in way job undertaken 
a  7.98%  13.83%  30.91%  37.14%  10.13%  –  – 
Informed over changes in finances: budget & profit 
a  17.59%  16.83%  28.22%  28.41%  8.96%  –  – 
Employee Involvement and Participation               
Managers seek employee views 
a  11.42%  17.38%  26.62%  33.70%  10.88%  –  – 
Managers respond to employee concerns 
a  13.05%  17.76%  29.97%  30.37%  8.85%  –  – 
Employees influence financial decisions 
a  21.37%  20.16%  31.66%  21.06%  5.75%  –  – 
Frequency of employee consultation meetings 
b  20.95%  20.70%  21.73%  18.12%  4.32%  10.84%  3.34% 
Targets set in consultation with employees 
c  64.87%  35.13%  –  –  –  –  – 
Discretion over work: e.g. tasks, pace, organization 
d  42.47%  10.62%  9.16%  10.59%  8.08%  8.07%  11.01% 
Index of % supervisors 
e  10.01%  43.36%  32.12%  8.64%  3.74%  1.23%  0.91% 
Organizational Trust               
Employers can be relied upon to keep their promises 
a  8.86%  18.42%  27.99%  35.80%  8.93%  –  – 
Employers are sincere in understanding employee views 
a  7.63%  16.21%  24.72%  41.14%  10.30%  –  – 
Employers deal with employees honestly 
a  7.63%  14.29%  25.79%  40.71%  11.57%  –  – 
Employers treat employees fairly 
a  8.43%  13.39%  24.61%  40.46%  13.11%  –  – 
Notes:  
a   0=very poor; 1=poor; 2=neither good nor poor; 3=good; 4=very good.  
b    0=none; 1=less than 3 months; 2=less than 1 month greater than 3 months; 3=less than a fortnight greater than 1 month; 4=less than weekly greater than a 
fortnight; 5=less than daily greater than once a week; 6=daily 
c    0=no, 1=yes 
d    Discretion amalgamation of responses to:  influence over tasks [0=none, 1=a little, 2=some, 3=a lot];  influence over pace of work [0=none, 1=a little, 2=some, 
3=a lot]; influence over way work executed [0=none, 1=a little, 2=some, 3=a lot]; influence over order tasks performed [0=none, 1=a little, 2=some, 3=a lot]; 
and influence over start and finish time [0=none, 1=a little, 2=some, 3=a lot]. Range shown in table 0=0-9; 1=10; 2=11; 3=12; 4=13; 5=14; 6=15. 
 e    0=none; 1=1-19%; 2=20-39%; 3=40-59%; 4=60-79%; 5=80-99%; 6=100%.  TABLE 3: THE DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT AND LOYALTY: EMPLOYEE LEVEL ANALYSIS 
  CLI=0  CLI=1  CLI=2  CLI=3  CLI=4 
M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT 
Information and Communication                     
Informed over way organization is run  -0.00023  (1.15)  -0.00349  (2.42)  -0.01405  (2.72)  -0.00427  (0.67)  0.02204  (4.62) 
Informed over changes in staffing  -0.00007  (0.32)  0.00002  (0.02)  0.00037  (0.07)  0.00386  (0.63)  -0.00418  (1.01) 
Informed over changes in way job undertaken  0.00005  (0.24)  -0.00301  (2.00)  -0.02061  (4.18)  0.01844  (2.93)  0.00514  (1.07) 
Informed over changes in finances: budget & profit  -0.00043  (2.53)  -0.00358  (3.05)  -0.00549  (1.41)  0.00553  (1.22)  0.00398  (1.30) 
Employee Involvement and Participation                     
Managers seek employee views  -0.00003  (0.14)  -0.00281  (1.88)  -0.01506  (3.03)  0.00085  (0.14)  0.01705  (3.61) 
Managers respond to employee concerns  -0.00057  (1.88)  -0.00344  (2.26)  -0.01852  (3.46)  0.01400  (2.15)  0.00852  (1.82) 
Employees influence financial decisions  -0.00016  (0.60)  -0.00266  (1.81)  -0.01027  (2.30)  0.00597  (1.16)  0.00712  (2.09) 
Frequency of employee consultation meetings  -0.00015  (1.56)  -0.00020  (0.31)  -0.00607  (2.60)  0.00145  (0.57)  0.00497  (2.43) 
Targets set in consultation with employees  -0.00033  (1.19)  -0.00384  (1.73)  -0.02479  (3.02)  0.01745  (1.96)  0.01151  (1.62) 
Discretion over work: e.g. tasks, pace, organization  -0.00015  (2.86)  -0.00167  (6.12)  -0.00904  (9.32)  0.00077  (0.64)  0.01008  (10.77) 
Index of % supervisors  -0.00015  (1.15)  -0.00179  (1.74)  -0.00373  (1.00)  -0.00193  (0.48)  0.00761  (2.51) 
Organizational Trust                     
Employers can be relied upon to keep promises  -0.00087  (3.08)  -0.00748  (5.25)  -0.03205  (6.30)  0.01228  (2.01)  0.02813  (6.19) 
Employers are sincere in understanding employee views  -0.00023  (1.15)  -0.00196  (1.26)  -0.03241  (6.04)  0.00945  (1.37)  0.02515  (4.51) 
Employers deal with employees honestly  -0.00037  (1.63)  -0.00624  (4.23)  -0.00959  (1.80)  0.00049  (0.07)  0.01572  (2.95) 
Employers treat employees fairly  -0.00078  (2.98)  -0.01014  (7.94)  -0.03458  (7.39)  0.02231  (3.63)  0.02319  (4.93) 
Employee and workplace characteristics                     
Male  0.00080  (1.93)  0.00744  (3.63)  0.01988  (2.63)  -0.02975  (3.40)  0.00163  (0.26) 
Part time  0.00022  (0.50)  -0.00084  (0.32)  0.01169  (1.19)  0.01702  (1.52)  -0.02809  (3.98) 
Age 16-19  0.77872  (13.42)  -0.70476  (9.01)  0.24279  (3.66)  -0.21856  (3.34)  -0.09819  (6.64) 
Age 20-29  0.55242  (10.02)  -0.48295  (6.69)  0.19313  (3.39)  -0.18599  (3.13)  -0.07661  (3.87) 
Age 30-39  0.36730  (6.95)  -0.32908  (5.37)  0.16598  (3.21)  -0.16387  (2.84)  -0.04034  (1.69) 
Age 40-49  0.40434  (7.76)  -0.36612  (6.09)  0.12869  (2.56)  -0.13897  (2.44)  -0.02794  (1.12) 
Age 50-59  0.41944  (7.55)  -0.38605  (6.06)  0.12359  (2.41)  -0.13812  (2.42)  -0.01887  (0.75) 
Age 60-64  0.69446  (8.83)  -0.65642  (7.35)  0.03838  (0.70)  -0.08279  (1.35)  0.00638  (0.21) 
Tenure ≤ 1 year  0.00112  (1.51)  0.00193  (0.60)  -0.00402  (0.39)  0.00040  (0.03)  0.00058  (0.07) 
Permanent contract  -0.00005  (0.10)  -0.00156  (0.41)  -0.00219  (0.16)  -0.00601  (0.36)  0.00981  (0.94) 
Trade union member  0.00008  (0.29)  0.00427  (1.89)  0.00054  (0.07)  0.00842  (1.24)  -0.01331  (2.54) 
Regular performance appraisal  0.00009  (0.33)  -0.00110  (0.47)  0.00596  (0.69)  0.00246  (0.27)  -0.00741  (0.98) 
Log wage  0.00004  (1.06)  0.00005  (1.53)  -0.00036  (1.97)  -0.00011  (0.44)  0.00040  (2.36) 
Log workplace size  -0.00079  (1.52)  -0.00696  (1.80)  -0.02165  (1.62)  0.03213  (2.16)  -0.00274  (0.23) 
Log  workplace  size squared  0.00007  (1.42)  0.00063  (1.78)  0.00171  (1.33)  -0.00224  (1.54)  -0.00017  (0.15) 
Percentage of dismissals  -0.00004  (0.81)  -0.00003  (0.10)  0.00074  (0.66)  0.00052  (0.48)  -0.00118  (1.68) 
Percentage of redundancies  0.00002  (1.32)  0.00046  (3.26)  0.00110  (2.12)  -0.00098  (2.24)  -0.00059  (1.54) 
Percentage of suspensions  -0.0025  (0.80)  0.00015  (0.06)  -0.00984  (1.04)  0.00944  (0.95)  0.00049  (0.06) 
OBSERVATIONS, Chi Squared  17,208      6,279.54  p=[0.000] 
Notes: M.E. Denotes marginal effect. Results are from a generalized ordered probit specification allowing for clustering effects within workplaces. TABLE 4: THE DETERMINANTS OF EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT AND LOYALTY: EMPLOYEE LEVEL ANALYSIS 
PANEL A: ALL COMPOSITE MEASURES  CLI=0  CLI=1  CLI=2  CLI=3  CLI=4 
M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT 
Information and Communication  -0.00116  (4.05)  -0.01232  (8.55)  -0.04898  (11.36)  0.01969  (5.30)  0.03359  (8.30) 
Employee Involvement and Participation  -0.00136  (4.14)  -0.01278  (9.18)  -0.06535  (13.98)  0.02887  (3.49)  0.05979  (14.42) 
Organizational Trust  -0.00265  (5.73)  -0.02616  (17.26)  -0.10365  (21.05)  0.04165  (6.93)  0.09081  (20.23) 
Employee and workplace characteristics                     
Male  0.00102  (2.10)  0.00744  (3.47)  0.01957  (2.60)  -0.03053  (3.52)  0.00249  (0.39) 
Part time  0.00028  (0.50)  -0.00144  (0.51)  0.00963  (0.98)  0.02097  (1.88)  -0.02945  (4.15) 
Age 16-19  0.86137  (20.31)  -0.77546  (10.90)  0.24197  (3.60)  -0.22292  (3.48)  -0.10496  (7.39) 
Age 20-29  0.66546  (13.72)  -0.58449  (8.49)  0.19619  (3.41)  -0.19003  (3.24)  -0.08714  (4.45) 
Age 30-39  0.47301  (8.95)  -0.42771  (6.86)  0.17323  (3.35)  -0.16731  (2.93)  -0.05123  (2.14) 
Age 40-49  0.50816  (9.98)  -0.46405  (7.75)  0.13539  (2.70)  -0.14128  (2.50)  -0.03822  (1.52) 
Age 50-59  0.52230  (9.67)  -0.48341  (7.64)  0.13184  (2.56)  -0.14194  (2.49)  -0.02879  (1.15) 
Age 60-64  0.78590  (12.65)  -0.74282  (9.71)  0.04205  (0.76)  -0.08322  (1.36)  -0.00192  (0.06) 
Tenure ≤ 1 year  0.00122  (1.42)  0.00058  (0.18)  -0.00859  (0.84)  0.00335  (0.28)  0.00344  (0.43) 
Permanent contract  -0.00016  (0.24)  -0.00248  (0.61)  -0.00202  (0.15)  -0.00416  (0.25)  0.00881  (0.83) 
Trade union member  0.00006  (0.15)  0.00491  (2.02)  -0.00009  (0.01)  -0.01138  (1.32)  0.00651  (0.96) 
Regular performance appraisal  0.00006  (0.16)  -0.00155  (0.63)  0.00333  (0.39)  0.00553  (0.60)  -0.00738  (0.98) 
Log wage  0.00005  (1.22)  0.00006  (1.43)  -0.00036  (1.95)  -0.00013  (0.56)  0.00043  (2.52) 
Log workplace size  -0.00097  (1.48)  -0.00670  (1.63)  -0.01759  (1.34)  0.02972  (2.01)  -0.00445  (0.37) 
Log  workplace  size squared  0.00008  (1.34)  0.00057  (1.52)  0.00139  (1.10)  -0.00208  (1.44)  0.00003  (0.03) 
Percentage of dismissals  -0.00004  (0.61)  0.00009  (0.28)  0.00076  (0.67)  0.00046  (0.44)  -0.00127  (1.77) 
Percentage of redundancies  0.00002  (1.36)  0.00049  (3.55)  0.00111  (2.09)  -0.00102  (2.33)  -0.00060  (1.51) 
Percentage of suspensions  -0.00022  (0.54)  0.00094  (0.35)  -0.00741  (0.79)  0.00707  (0.71)  -0.00037  (0.05) 
Chi Squared  5591.04  p=[0.000] 
PANEL B: INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION  CLI=0  CLI=1  CLI=2  CLI=3  CLI=4 
M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT 
Information and Communication  -0.00699  (11.09)  -0.03943  (6.59)  -0.11968  (33.88)  0.05323  (10.99)  0.11286  (31.70) 
Chi Squared  3829.38  p=[0.000] 
PANEL C: INVOLVEMENT & PARTICIPATION  CLI=0  CLI=1  CLI=2  CLI=3  CLI=4 
M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT 
Employee Involvement and Participation  -0.00548  (7.26)  -0.04304  (5.69)  -0.15399  (36.48)  0.06265  (11.47)  0.13986  (35.81) 
Chi Squared  4172.51  p=[0.000] 
PANEL D: ORGANIZATIONAL TRUST  CLI=0  CLI=1  CLI=2  CLI=3  CLI=4 
M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT  M.E.  TSTAT 
Organizational Trust  -0.00871  (12.44)  -0.04236  (5.04)  -0.12601  (30.96)  0.04799  (8.93)  0.12909  (33.00) 
Chi Squared  3471.14  p=[0.000] 
OBSERVATIONS  17,208 
Notes: M.E. Denotes marginal effect. Results are from a generalized ordered probit specification allowing for clustering effects within workplaces. Controls in Panels B-D as in Panel A. 
TABLE 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WORKPLACE PERFORMANCE AND EMPLOYEE CLI: WORKPLACE LEVEL ANALYSIS 
PANEL A: AVERAGE EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT-LOYALTY INDEX WITHIN THE WORKPLACE 
  LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (LP)  FINANCIAL PRODUCTIVITY (FP) 
  0  1  2  3  0  1  2  3 
















Wald Chi Squared  117.07  p=[0.000]  238.36  p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared  0.0656  0.0662 
PANEL B: AVERAGE EMPLOYEE COMMITMENT-LOYALTY INDEX BY OCCUPATION WITHIN THE WORKPLACE 
  LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (LP)  FINANCIAL PRODUCTIVITY (FP) 






*  0.0022  -0.0272
-  0.0718
* 





*  -0.0172  -0.0048
*  0.0532
* 





*  0.0086  -0.0267
*  0.0565
* 





*  0.0388  -0.0025
*  0.0255
* 





*  -0.0288  -0.0363
*  0.1110
* 





*  0.0437  -0.0268
*  0.0103
* 













*  0.0052  -0.0101
*  0.0344
* 
Wald Chi Squared  248.79  p=[0.000]  342.44  p=[0.000] 
Pseudo R Squared  0.0919  0.0862 
OBSERVATIONS  1,432 
Notes: Marginal effects are shown for LP and FP. T statistics are shown in parenthesis. A generalized ordered probit specification is used to model LP and FP. Controls 
include: average wage; quadratic in workplace size; quadratic in workplace age; index of labor costs as a proportion of sales revenue; proportions of females, ethnic origin, 
unskilled; foreign ownership; UK multinational; trade union recognition; performance related pay or employee share ownership; public sector and industry dummy variables. 
*denotes statistical significance at the 5 per cent level from a joint test of the null hypothesis that on the           coefficient plus the differential slope coefficient (i.e.           
interacted with specific occupational indicators) are equal to zero. 
 
 
 